Introduction
Joint ventures (JVs) are defined as independent legal entities in which two or more firms combine resources through equity participation i . Prior empirical research such as McConnell and Nantell (1985) ; Slovin, Suska, and Mantecon (2007) ; Kumar (2007) ; and Anand and Khanna (2000) finds that forming JVs benefits parents ' shareholders ii . Economies of scale (Harrigan, 1988) , economies of scope (Slovin, Suska, and Mantecon, 2007) , and lower capital commitments (Kogut, 1991; Chi, 2000) generate these benefits.
However, some JVs have an instable tendency. They can go bankrupt, get sold to a third party, or fall under the exclusive control of one of their parent companies, according to Harrigan (1988) , Cui and Kumar (2012) , and Cui, Calantone, and Griffith (2011) . Therefore, prior research also investigates whether a combination of JVs and the subsequent termination makes a merit or which factors affect JV stability. For example, Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) and Arend and Mantecon (2008) insist that the combination reduces information asymmetry when either or both parents have a plan of a divestiture. Blodgett (1992) and Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) find that ownership percentages of parent companies affect a stability of JVs. Park and Russo (1996) and Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2000) find that JVs with parent companies that are in the same industry are unstable because the parents are often rivals and may disagree over managing their JVs.
Otsubo
There is a puzzle that JVs tend to terminate for a short period although a lot of merits from JV formation are referred in prior research. This paper focuses on parent"s contribution in forming JVs and investigates the relationship between types of the parents" contributions and the stability of JVs. Although many researchers investigate whether and how JVs benefit parent companies, few focus on the effects of the parents" contributions in forming JVs except for Pearce and Hatfield (2002) and Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) . Pearce and Hatfield (2002) categorize and compare JVs according to parent"s contributions and Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) categorize JVs according to parents" contributions and compare the performances. Neither focuses on the relationship between parents" contributions and JV stability, although they insist on an importance of JVs categorized by parents" contributions. This paper proposes that parents" contributions in forming JVs prescribe iii the merits of JVs, which in turn affect the stability of those JVs. Parent companies may choose one of several investment methods to pursue certain merit of JVs. For example, a parent company employs existing business departments or subsidiaries to form JVs and otherwise, it may employ financial assets. It is a kind of a divestiture for firms with existing business departments to form JVs, which are referred as "quasi-asset sale" by Slovin, Suska and Mantecon (2007) . In addition, it becomes a complete divestiture if firms with existing business departments dispose the ownership of JVs, which means a termination of JVs. Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) investigates the stock market reaction to announcements of JV formations and terminations; they find that the market regards the combination of JVs and the subsequent termination as alternative mechanisms for transferring assets in the presence of a high degree of asymmetric information. In this case, the termination is not a failure or unexpected event but planned by the parent companies. Furthermore, the combination seems to have a merit of reduction of information asymmetry. This paper can contribute to research relating to the termination of JVs by considering new perspective of parents" investment methods. In addition, it may contribute to research of divestitures. In other divestitures such as sell-offs, there is a significant information asymmetry between acquiring firms and selling firms. It is difficult for acquiring firms to obtain an intrinsic value of assets, whereas selling firms can recognize it easily. However, acquiring firms can have an opportunity to learn the value by forming JVs with selling firms and after that, negotiate for a complete acquisition. Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) refers it as "a means of ""dating"" through a transitional vehicle (the JV) to enhance the value of the subsequent ""marriage"" or merger". This paper can contribute research of divestitures as well as JVs as a particular type of JVs categorized by parents" contributions possibly has a unique merit of reducing information asymmetry in a divestiture.
Using a multiple-comparison procedure and event-history analysis, this paper produces three empirical results. First, parents" characteristics including JV scale, parents" ownership percentage, industry, and duration of the JV are different among JVs categorized by parents" contributions. For example, scale of JVs in which all parent companies employ existing business departments to form JVs is greater than other types of JVs, which is possibly consistent with the notion that parent companies form this type of JVs to enjoy scale economies. Conversely, these factors do not vary according to how JVs eventually terminate. These results seem to indicate that these characteristics do not affect JV stability but instead reflect the merits of different investment methods.
Second, JVs duration years differ with the types of JVs categorized by parents" contributions. Specifically, of all the terminated JVs, JVs in which all parent companies mainly employ financial assets to form JVs tend to have the longest lives, consistent with the notion that investment method influences JV stability.
Third, parents that are in the same industry as their JVs or supply financial capital in the JVs in which one parent company employs existing business departments to form JVs and another employs financial capital are more likely to acquire 100% of their JVs after the formation. This result is consistent with the notion that the combination of JVs and the subsequent acquisition has a merit of reducing information asymmetry in a particular type of JVs. In addition, parent companies that own more than 50% of their JVs are more likely to acquire 100% of those JVs later regardless of investment method, which is consistent with Nanda and Williamson (1995) .
Overall, these results are new findings which are not investigated by prior research. At the same time, they are consistent with the notion that parents" contributions in forming JVs are related to the merits of JVs and the stability of those JVs. In particular, JVs in which either or both parents employ existing business departments in forming have a merit of reducing information asymmetry, which causes a termination of the JVs. This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews related literature. Section 2 categorizes the JVs and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data and methodology. Section 4 shows the empirical results. The final section concludes this paper.
Literature Review
Prior empirical research iv finds that the stocks of parent companies tend to react positively to JV formations. This indicates that JVs have certain benefits for parents, v including economies of scale, synergy, lower capital investment requirements, and reduction of information asymmetry. Hennart (1988) referring to the benefits of scale economies insists that JVs are created when firms enter together a contiguous stage of production or distribution, or a new market. In these circumstances, JVs help companies create an immediate large-scale presence. Slovin, Suska, and Mantecon (2007); McConnell and Nantell (1985) ; Marjit and Chowdhury (2004); and Kumar (2007) find that parent companies create synergies when their JVs belong to related industries or hold different technologies. In addition, Johnson and Houston (2000) find that horizontal JVs create synergies but vertical JVs do not. Kogut (1991) and Chi (2000) find that JVs reduce parents' initial capital commitments because more than one firm invests in a JV. A lot of prior research including Kumar (2007) and Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) focus on an information asymmetry or information uncertainty. When there is significant information asymmetry between a selling firm and an acquiring firm, they can reduce it by forming JVs. They can get necessary information through JVs. In addition, Arend and Mantecon (2008) divide information asymmetries related to JVs into two categories: asset valuation and future synergy valuation. The purchasing firm needs to evaluate them precisely when it acquires business units or subsidiaries of other firms. Arend and Mantecon (2008) find that firms need more time to evaluate the value of future synergies than current assets. Therefore, a parent is more likely to acquire 100% of a JV related to asset valuation more quickly than a JV related to future synergy. Similarly, JVs can be tools that resolve uncertainty of future prospects. According to Chi (2000) , Reuer and Tong (2005) , and Cui and Kumar (2012) , JVs are formed as real options and help companies expand in response to future technological and market developments. In addition, Kogut (1991) For this reason, a considerable amount of research investigates why parents terminate JVs, including the nature of the relationships between and among JVs and parents (Cui and Kumar, 2012) , parent performance (Cui and Kumar, 2012) , parent M&A activity (Cui, Calantone, and Griffith, 2011) , rivalries with and among parents (Park and Russo, 1996) , vertical relationships between parents and JVs (Park and Russo, 1996) , percentage ownership inequalities among parents (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Park and Ungson, 1997; and Blodgett, 1992) , and uncertainty within the JVs (Kogut, 1991) .
In addition, there is the controversy over whether a JV termination is a failure for parent companies. Most research in this area (e.g., Reuer, 2001 ) relies on the notion that a JV's longevity indicates collaborative success and a JV termination reflects failure by the parent companies or the venture itself. However, Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) and Arend and Mantecon (2008) find that when a parent acquires 100% of a JV, its shareholders benefit-in other words, terminating a JV might actually be a sign of success. Pearce and Hatfield (2002) and Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) categorize JVs according to parents" contributions in forming JVs. Pearce and Hatfield (2002) focuses on a balance between parent companies to form JVs and categorizes JVs into three types: Balanced between partners, Dominant partner, and JV self-resourcing. Under the Balanced-Partner structure, all parents contribute roughly equivalent resources. The Dominant-Partner structure entails a comparatively unequal flow of resources from the parents to their JV. Finally, with the JV Self-Resourcing option, the JV has full authorization to seek and obtain all of its resources from the marketplace. Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) , assuming for reasons of simplicity joint ventures with two parents, categorizes JVs into four types from parents" contributions perspectives and proposes that these four types of JVs have their own typical control pattern. First, the different parents may contribute similar types of assets and skills to the joint venture (type I). They insist that this type of joint venture is typically set up for reasons of economies of scale. Second, most of the assets and skills may be contributed by one of the parents (type II). The other parent"s contributions are limited to financial resources. Third, the different parents may contribute different but complementary crucial assets (type III). Fourth, the parents" contributions to the joint venture may be very limited (type IV). In this type, parents" contributions are roughly limited to financial resources.
Parents' Contribution and Hypotheses
Similar with Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) , this paper assumes for reasons of simplicity joint ventures with two parents and focuses on whether parent companies contribute their departments or subsidiaries to JVs. There are logically three different situations. First, both parents deploy existing departments to form the JV (Goods finance JVs). This type of JV may be formed when both parents employ existing departments within the same industry. Second, one parent deploys existing departments and the other contributes partial assets viii or financial capital (Business transfer JVs). In this scenario, the parent company contributing existing business units rather than cash divest them, though it does not lose the control completely. On the other hand, the parent without existing business units partially acquires them through its capital contribution. Third, both neither parents provide existing departments but provide partial assets or financial capital (New business JVs). This may occur if the parents form the JV to enter a new market or launch a new business because either or both parents can choose goods finance to form a JV if they are already involved in the business.
This section proposes several hypotheses relating to JV termination by focusing on investment methods of parent firms, which are not considered in prior research. The Goods finance JVs are comparatively equivalent to the type I in Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) because these are formed through similar types of assets by both parents. These JVs seem to be formed when both parents intend to create a JV that may become much larger than each existing business before the JV. In this case, the parents often are in the same industry and can expect the economies of scale which are referred to by Harrigan (1988) and Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) . However, economies of scale are usually not reason enough to explain a JV formation because one parent company enjoys it by acquiring other parent"s business units instead of forming a JV.
As mentioned, JVs also reduce information asymmetries. One of the parents, for example, may have a plan of M&A strategy that could include purchasing 100% of the JV later in addition to enjoying some economies of scale. In this situation, the JV acts as an information-gathering tool that the parents use to value assets (Arend and Mantecon, 2008) .
ix As a result, these JVs may terminate immediately after their formation because the parent purchases 100% of the entity. These JVs often start out with unequal ownership percentages among parents; the parent that intends to acquire the JV completely often retains majority ownership (Nanda and Williamson, 1995) . Accordingly, three hypotheses formalize these ideas.
Hypothesis 1-A: The Goods finance JVs are larger than JVs financed using other investment methods. Hypothesis 1-B: Ownership percentages among parents of the Goods finance JVs tend to be unequal and parent with more than 50% ownership acquires 100% of those JVs. Hypothesis 1-C: Parent of the Goods finance JVs is more likely to acquire 100% of those JVs soon after the JVs form.
Next, the Business transfer JVs are roughly equivalent to type II in Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) in which most of the assets may be contributed by one parent. It is possibly formed when a parent with existing departments does not have enough cash to invest an existing business additionally. In this situation, use of the Business transfer JVs may indicate that the parent contributing to existing departments has financial constraints. On the other hand, the parent with financial capital, planning an acquisition of existing departments, may attend a JV formation to reduce information asymmetries like the case of the Goods finance JVs. In that case, the parent with financial capital seems to acquire majority ownership in forming the JV.
Accordingly, three more hypotheses formalize these ideas.
Hypothesis 2-A: Parents with financial constraints are more likely to contribute existing departments rather than financial capital in the Business transfer JVs. Hypothesis 2-B: Parent with cash contributions tends to retain more ownership percentages of JVs than parent with assets contributions in the Business transfer JVs. Hypothesis 2-C: Parent contributing a financial capital tends to acquire JVs completely in the Business transfer JVs soon after forming those JVs.
Finally, the New business JVs are equivalent to a mixture of type III and IV in Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) . As mentioned, parents often form JVs to take capitalize on synergies, such as combining complimentary technologies. The New business JVs should therefore tend to have parents that are in related industries. That is, both parents are neither completely the same nor completely different but have some vertical or horizontal relationship. In addition, the New business JVs may tend to terminate via dissolution because they are generally riskier ventures than the Goods finance JVs and the Business transfer JVs both of which are related to an existing business. Even if a parent or third party acquires the JV after its formation, it may take many years because they need time to evaluate the value of the synergies, according to Arend and Mantecon (2008) . In other words, the New business JVs seem to be stable.
Accordingly, three hypotheses formalize these ideas. 
Methodology
This study uses the Nikkei Telecom database, which includes business articles from Japanese newspapers, to generate a suitable sample of JVs. The database search looks for articles related to JVs formed by two x Japanese firms between 1985 and 2007 xi . The database also provides information about investment methods and changes in JVs. JVs in which either or both parent companies do not employ certain assets or financial capital but employ existing departments or subsidiaries are categorized as Goods finance JVs or the Business transfer JVs. On the other hand, JVs in which both parents employ certain assets which are not autonomy as a whole or financial capital are categorized as New business JVs. The sample is restricted to JVs formed by domestic listed firms in order to obtain financial data on the parent companies and avoid influences of cultural and institutional differences, as Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) and Park and Ungson (1997) argue. In addition, the sample only includes JVs for which information about the amount of stated capital, termination, xii and parent ownership percentages are available at least in the Nikkei Telecom, the 2012 Toyo Keizai Sinpousha book of Japanese firms, or in the annual reports of each parent company. Furthermore, JVs involving parent companies in the financial industry are eliminated. The final sample includes 590 JVs. Necessary financial and category data of industries as defined by the Tokyo Stock Exchange is from the Nikkei NEEDs Financial QUEST database.
Table 1 Establishment years and investment methods of JVs
New business JVs ：Both parent companies fund venture with financial capital or certain assets which are not autonomy as a whole. Goods finance JVs ：Both parent companies fund venture with existing departments or subsidiaries. Business transfer JVs ：One parent funds venture with financial capital or certain assets, the other funds venture with existing departments or subsidiaries. Table 1 shows the formation years and investment methods of the sample JVs. The total number of JVs increases after 2000, possibly indicating that JVs are not a substitute for M&A (the number of M&A transactions also increased in Japan since 2000).
xiii The New business JVs constitute more than half of the sample. In addition, the number of the Goods finance JVs increases after 1995. Table 2 shows the number of JVs categorized by investment method and changes after formation. Approximately 58% of the sample JVs change for some reason after formation-nearly the same percentage found in prior research on American JVs (57% of JVs terminate, according to Cui, Calantone, and Griffith, 2011) . Acquisition is the largest reason for termination, followed by dissolution-also similar to Cui, Calantone, and Griffith (2011) . Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that the Goods finance JVs or Business transfer JVs tend to be acquired, which is consistent with hypotheses 1-C and 2-C.
Multiple-comparison procedure and event-history analysis xiv investigate the mutual relationships between the investment methods, the merits of the JVs, and their instability. First, in a multiple-comparison procedure, Tukey-Kramer's method xv helps avoid type I errors that may arise from comparing three groups of investment methods. This analysis investigates whether variables possibly reflecting merits of a JV including scale, parent performance, ownership percentages, business relationships between and among parent companies and JVs, and the time between JV formation and termination change are different among JV terminations as well as parents" investment methods. Hypotheses 1-A, 1-B, 2-A, 2-B, and 3-A expect these variables to vary with investment method but not with the way JVs terminate. JV scale is the natural logarithm of the amount of stated capital xvi in a JV in its year of formation. Parent firm performance xvii is measured with Adj. ROA (operating profits / total assets*100) and Adj. CF ratio (operating cash flow / total assets*100) in the year of formation. Ownership percentage of JVs by parent companies is measured by the Equal ownership dummy (which equals 1 if both parent companies retain 50% of ownership; otherwise, 0) at the year of formation.
Business relationships between and among parent companies and JVs are measured two ways. One is the Same industry dummy, which equals 1 if both parents belong to the same industry and 0 otherwise. The other is the Vertical relatedness and the Complementarity at the year of formation as suggested by Fan and Lang (2000) , who construct the indexes using commodity flow data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Park and Russo (1996) , the event-history analysis investigates individual JV terminations through acquisitions or dissolutions. Hypotheses 1-C, 2-C, and 3-C predict that the Goods finance JVs and the Business transfer JVs are more likely to terminate via acquisition sooner than the New business JVs. On the other hand, hypothesis 3-B predicts that the New business JVs tend to terminate via dissolution.
The Cox proportional-hazard model employs additional variables as a covariate: the firm group dummy (which equals 1 if both parents belong to the same group; otherwise it equals 0), the general trading dummy (which equals 1 if a parent is a general trading company xviii ; otherwise it equals 0), JV experiences (the average number of JVs both parents establish from 1985 to 2007), Parent scale (the natural logarithm of average total assets of both parent companies in the year of JV formation), Parent R&D (the average of R&D divided by total assets of both parent companies in the year of JV formation), Parent advertisements (the average advertising cost divided by total assets of both parent companies in the year of JV formation), and year dummies.
xix Cui and Kumar (2012) , employing an event-history analysis, find that JV experiences and parent size affect JV termination. Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2000) also find that the JV establishment year affects termination. Cui, Calantone, and Griffith (2011) and Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) find that parents' R&D and advertising costs also affect JV termination. In addition, Japanese firms in the same corporate group are more likely to form JVs and that Japanese general trading companies tend to form JVs with other Japanese firms launching in overseas markets. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. Variables from 1 to 8 are used to investigate the hypotheses. Variables of 9 and 10 are used to control special characteristics of Japanese firms. Finally, variables from 11 to 14 are used as a control variable because past studies xx employ them to investigate the terminations of JVs. Table 4 shows the results of multiple comparisons in which the JV sample is divided according to investment methods and termination type. Panel A shows that JV size varies with investment method and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The Goods finance JVs constitute the largest group, followed by the Business transfer JVs, which is consistent with hypothesis 1-A.
Results

Multiple Comparisons
The Adj. ROA and Adj. CF ratio variables, both of which indicate firm performance, indicate that means of Goods finance JVs are lower than other investment methods, which is consistent with hypothesis 2-A. However, the differences are not statistically significant, except for the difference of the Adj. ROA between New business JVs and Goods finance JVs. The Equity ownership dummy, which indicates whether parent companies retain equal ownership of a JV, shows that the Goods finance JVs tend to have parents that retain equal ownership compared to other investment methods, which is statistically significant. This result rejects hypothesis 1-B and is partially consistent with hypothesis 2-B.
Variables indicating the business relationships among parents and JVs include the P-P industry dummy, the P-JV industry dummy, vertical relatedness, and complementarity. These variables show that parents of the New business JVs tend to have weaker business relationships than JVs using other investment methods, which is consistent with hypothesis 3-A. For example, the P-P industry and complementarity of New business JVs are 0.249 and 0.496, respectively, both of which are the lowest among investment methods. In addition, these variables are statistically significant for the New business JVs and Goods finance JVs.
Finally, New business JVs have average lifetimes of 7.554 years, which is higher than others. The difference between New business JVs and Goods finance JVs is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, though the differences between New business JVs and Goods finance JVs is not statistically significant. This result is partially consistent with hypothesis 3-C.
In panel B which categorizes JVs by type of termination, most results are not statistically significant, which is a remarkable difference from panel A. This difference seems to indicate that factors related to the merits of JVs do not have a relationship with the termination of those JVs but do have a strong relationship with investment methods. That is, these factors don"t affect whether and how JVs terminate, but they do reflect the differences in the merits prescribed by the investment methods. Figure 1 shows the results of estimated JV duration years for the full sample, categorized by investment method. The "+" mark indicates a censored case. Business transfer JVs appear more likely to terminate than other investment method JVs, though all three decrease JV survival probability. New business JVs tend to survive the longest, which is consistent with hypothesis 3-C. This seems to indicate that investment method Table 5 Results of comparison tests of survival distributions Table 6 shows the results of the Cox proportional-hazard model. In the results of full sample in which the terminating events include acquisitions and dissolution, estimated coefficients of New business JVs are negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In the results of acquisition in which terminating events are acquisitions only, the These results seem to indicate that New business JVs tend to be more stable than Business transfer JVs and Goods finance JVs. In addition, Business transfer JVs and Goods finance JVs tend to terminate because of acquisitions, which is consistent with hypotheses 1-C, 2-C, and 3-C. Finally, in the results of dissolution, all of the coefficients of Goods finance JVs and New business JVs are positive but are not statistically significant. This result is not consistent with hypothesis 3-B. In focusing on control variables, the coefficients of JV scale in the results of dissolution are negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that small JVs are more likely to dissolute. Adj. ROA in the results of full sample and dissolution are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that JVs formed by low-performing parent companies are more likely to dissolve.
In focusing on business relationships, including the P-P industry dummy, P-JV industry dummy, Vertical relatedness, and Complementarity, only the coefficients of Vertical relatedness and Complementarity in full sample and acquisition are statistically significant. This suggests that JVs formed by parent companies with vertical relationships are less likely to terminate via acquisition. On the contrary, JVs formed by parents with complementary relationship are likely not to terminate.
All of the coefficients of the General trading dummy are negative but most of which are not statistically significant. Finally, the coefficients of Parent advertisements are positive and statistically significant in all results, suggesting that JVs with parent companies that have high advertising budgets are more likely to terminate the JVs via acquisition or dissolution, which is consistent with Cui, Calantone, and Griffith (2011) and Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) .
As described, the New business JVs tend to be more stable than the Business transfer JVs and Goods finance JVs, which is consistent with hypotheses 1-C, 2-C, and 3-C. However, it is clear that the three investment methods do not affect a dissolution of JVs, which is not consistent with hypothesis 3-B. The Business transfer JVs particularly seem to be the most unstable, as they tend to be acquired by one parent.
Additional Investigations of Acquisition
The empirical results seem to indicate that the Business transfer JVs and Goods finance JVs are more likely to be acquired by a parent company. However, these results do not identify which parent acquires those JVs. For example, the Adj. ROA and Adj. CF ratio variables in Table 6 are the averages of two parent companies. The variables do not indicate whether the parents with better performance tend to be the acquirers. For this reason, this section focuses on the relationship between the characteristics of parent companies (specifically, business relationship, ownership percentages, and firm performances xxi ) and investment methods when a JV terminates via acquisition. Table 7 shows the relationship between parent company characteristics and investment methods using only JVs acquired by one parent. Panel A shows whether the parent and JV are in the same industry. The results show that 63 (48%) of the New business JVs were acquired by a parent in the same industry, and 18 (60%) of the Goods finance JVs were acquired by a parent company in same industry. However, 16 (80%) of the Business transfer JVs were acquired by a parent in the same industry. The result of the Pearson"s chi squared test in the table is 7.6968, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These results seem to show that parents planning to acquire a business unit or subsidiary in the same industry tend to form the Business transfer JVs.
Panel B shows whether a parent retaining more (or less) than 50% of a JV at its formation is more likely to acquire the JV later. The results show that parents with more than 50% ownership in their JVs tend to acquire those JVs regardless of investment method, which is consistent with Nanda and Williamson (1995) . For example, 59% of parent companies with more than 50% ownership in their JVs acquire all of the ownership in the New business JVs. In other words, investment method does not seem to influence whether a parent acquires a JV. In fact, the result of the Pearson"s chi squared test is 2.3721, which is not statistically significant. Finally, panel E shows that 70% of parents that finance their JVs with cash rather than assets acquire those JVs if they are the Business transfer JVs. This result is consistent with the notion that parents with money likely have plans to acquire the JVs at formation, whereas parents that contribute existing departments to a JV are likely to divest the JV later.
Overall, parents that invest cash in the Business transfer JVs and are in the same industry are more likely to acquire their JVs, which is particularly different from the other two investment methods.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationships between investment methods of the JVs and the stability considering merits of JVs. Using a multiple-comparison procedure and event-history analysis, the study mainly finds three empirical results.
First, categorizing the sample of JVs by investment method shows that investment method influences parents" characteristics such as the size of the stake parents take in JVs, how long the JV exists, and the size of the JV. On the other hand, categorizing the JV sample according to termination type shows that the termination type has little influence on those factors. These results support the notion that these factors don"t affect whether and how JVs terminate, but they do reflect the differences in the merits prescribed by the investment methods.
Second, JV survival rates differ among investment methods. New business JVs survive the longest compared with other investment methods, which may relate to parent"s M&A strategies. This result is consistent with the notion that investment method influences JV stability.
Third, parents that mainly contribute cash to a JV in the same industry are more likely to acquire 100% of those JVs in the Business transfer JVs. This result is consistent with the notion that the combination of JVs and the subsequent acquisition has a merit of reducing of information asymmetry in the Business transfer JVs. Namely, this type of JV is employed as a means of divestitures.
These results are new findings which are not investigated by prior research. They imply that parent companies may choose one of investment methods to obtain a particular merit in forming JVs. In addition, parents may have a plan of termination of JVs in forming JVs if the merit relates a divestiture. Therefore, this paper can contribute to research relating to the termination of JVs by considering new perspective of parents" investment methods. At the same time, the study supports Pearce and Hatfield (2002) and Kamminga and Kooistra (2006) in that parents" contributions are very influential in JVs.
However, some unexplained questions remain. First, does each merit prescribed by investment method actually enhance the wealth of parents' shareholders? Whether each JV merit actually enhances the wealth is not clear although prior research xxii finds that the stock market reacts positively to JVs termination as well as JVs formation as a whole.
In particular, does a JV's contribution to shareholder wealth depend on how a JV is terminated as well as how it is formed? For example, is the Business transfer JV regarded as a failure if it is acquired by a third party or the parent that originally contributed existing departments instead of cash to the venture? Second, the sizes of the investment-method subsamples vary widely. In particular, the number of the New business JVs is much greater than the number of JVs formed under the other two investment methods. They may have several merits according to parents" characteristics. For example, sample of the New business JVs in this paper includes JVs formed in foreign countries as well as Japan. In this case, the merit of JVs in a foreign country is different from JVs in Japan. Additional investigation is needed.
Endnotes
i See Kumar (2007) . ii A parent company is a firm that forms a JV and retains the ownership. In this paper, a parent company doesn"t necessarily retain control of a JV, meaning it may retain less than 50% ownership. iii Parent companies may choose an investment method based on the JV merits they wish to obtain. iv See McConnell and Nantell (1985) , Slovin, Suska, and Mantecon (2007) , Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) , Hanvanich, Richards, Miller, and Cavusgil (2003) , and Kumar (2007) . v At the same time, prior research shows that stock market reactions are different among parent companies and vary with the characteristics of the parent companies. For example, Kumar (2007) finds that some JVs enhance shareholder wealth for both parent companies and others enhance shareholder wealth for one parent only. vi See Park and Ungson (1997) , Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) , and Reuer (2001) . vii See Hennart, Kim, and Zeng (1998) , Park and Russo (1996) , and Cui, Calantone, and Griffith (2011) . viii Partial assets do not mean an autonomous business unit such as a subsidiary but mean several assets which are not autonomy as a whole. ix Information asymmetry of future synergy valuation is not considered because both parent companies divest business units belonging to same industry. x Prior research tends to involve only JVs with two parent companies to avoid complexity (e.g., Kumar, 2007) . xi End of investigating period is not 2013 but 2007 because several years are needed to investigate a change of JVs. This paper adopts 5 years as prior research such as Cui and Kumar (2012) periods (1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2007) and year dummies are constructed. xx Cui and Kumar (2012) employs the number of JVs parents established and parent's scale to investigate termination of JVs. Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) also employs parent's R&D and advertisements to investigate termination of JVs. xxi These variables are selected by whether these relate to the hypotheses and are possibly different among parent companies. xxii See Slovin, Suska and Mantecon (2007) , Mantecon and Chatfield (2007) , and Arend and Mantecon (2008) .
